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01/30/2010
The Messenger (Georgia)
January 27, 2010
The frequent visits of opposition party leader Zurab Noghaideli to Russia and his contacts with top Russian officials have forced the opposition to regroup and reorganise on the basis of the parties' respective positions on relations between Georgia and Russia. Previously the various parties could be classified as either Parliamentary or non-Parliamentary/radical opposition. Now the parties are seen as either Russian oriented or Western oriented.
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union being pro-Russian became very unpopular and those with such a position had almost no support in society. In addition there were high expectations about support from the West. The Rose Revolution was made possible by the great popular support Western orientation enjoyed in the country. However NATO's refusal to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest summit and in particular the Russian invasion of Georgia have made it clear that the power of Russian aggression is much greater than the support Georgia receives from the West.
Georgia has fallen into a very difficult situation which could deteriorate further if Yanukovich wins the Ukrainian elections. This will be yet another defeat for the West and USA in their undeclared battle against Russia for leadership in the post-Soviet space.
Opposition Vice Speaker of Parliament Paata Davitaia has stated that whether Russia intends to attack Georgia again will become clear after February 7 (the date of the second round of the Ukrainian Presidential elections) This prediction is very dramatic, but it is obvious that Russia will conduct further provocations against Georgia if it is victorious in Ukraine. Leader of the Popular Front Nodar Natadze thinks that some organisation with an attractive name may be created which will invite the Russians into Georgia, and many other tried and tested Soviet methods of destabilisation could be employed by the present Kremlin regime.
There are two major reasons for the strengthening of the Russian position in Georgia. First, Russia itself wants to find some forces loyal to it in Georgia and second, it is taking advantage of the frustration people feel now that their the high expectations of the West have proven unfounded. In this latter respect Russia has an undeniable advantage because no one expects Russia to do anything good for Georgia. No hopes can be dashed because no one has any hope, but if people have to work with Russia they may as well see how much they can get out of doing so.
Noghaideli has made a breakthrough in relations with Russia. Until he made his open and multiple visits in December last year all contacts between the countries had been conducted discreetly and often not in Russia. Noghaideli has made this communication transparent, and by so doing seeks to show that there is no other way out and the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity can only be done through dialogue with Russia. Moreover the NATO leadership has recommended that Georgia conduct dialogue with Russia, a hint if not a straightforward indication of what Georgia has to do if it wants NATO's support in future.
So this way or that pro-Russian forces have started conducting their activities in Georgia openly. Some analysts see this as a serious retreat from the previous pro-Western position. However the positive aspect of it is that someone who says something in favour of Russia is not now labelled an agent or a traitor. Now any type of opinion, even those contradicting the prevailing ones, has the right to exist in Georgia, a small but maybe decisive step forward for democracy.
January 27, 2010
Discord in the opposition over Russia
By Messenger StaffThe frequent visits of opposition party leader Zurab Noghaideli to Russia and his contacts with top Russian officials have forced the opposition to regroup and reorganise on the basis of the parties' respective positions on relations between Georgia and Russia. Previously the various parties could be classified as either Parliamentary or non-Parliamentary/radical opposition. Now the parties are seen as either Russian oriented or Western oriented.
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union being pro-Russian became very unpopular and those with such a position had almost no support in society. In addition there were high expectations about support from the West. The Rose Revolution was made possible by the great popular support Western orientation enjoyed in the country. However NATO's refusal to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest summit and in particular the Russian invasion of Georgia have made it clear that the power of Russian aggression is much greater than the support Georgia receives from the West.
Georgia has fallen into a very difficult situation which could deteriorate further if Yanukovich wins the Ukrainian elections. This will be yet another defeat for the West and USA in their undeclared battle against Russia for leadership in the post-Soviet space.
Opposition Vice Speaker of Parliament Paata Davitaia has stated that whether Russia intends to attack Georgia again will become clear after February 7 (the date of the second round of the Ukrainian Presidential elections) This prediction is very dramatic, but it is obvious that Russia will conduct further provocations against Georgia if it is victorious in Ukraine. Leader of the Popular Front Nodar Natadze thinks that some organisation with an attractive name may be created which will invite the Russians into Georgia, and many other tried and tested Soviet methods of destabilisation could be employed by the present Kremlin regime.
There are two major reasons for the strengthening of the Russian position in Georgia. First, Russia itself wants to find some forces loyal to it in Georgia and second, it is taking advantage of the frustration people feel now that their the high expectations of the West have proven unfounded. In this latter respect Russia has an undeniable advantage because no one expects Russia to do anything good for Georgia. No hopes can be dashed because no one has any hope, but if people have to work with Russia they may as well see how much they can get out of doing so.
Noghaideli has made a breakthrough in relations with Russia. Until he made his open and multiple visits in December last year all contacts between the countries had been conducted discreetly and often not in Russia. Noghaideli has made this communication transparent, and by so doing seeks to show that there is no other way out and the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity can only be done through dialogue with Russia. Moreover the NATO leadership has recommended that Georgia conduct dialogue with Russia, a hint if not a straightforward indication of what Georgia has to do if it wants NATO's support in future.
So this way or that pro-Russian forces have started conducting their activities in Georgia openly. Some analysts see this as a serious retreat from the previous pro-Western position. However the positive aspect of it is that someone who says something in favour of Russia is not now labelled an agent or a traitor. Now any type of opinion, even those contradicting the prevailing ones, has the right to exist in Georgia, a small but maybe decisive step forward for democracy.
[More]
01/29/2010
New York Times
January 29, 2010
For Russia, the past decade started out on an optimistic note. The country was emerging from a severe financial crisis and the political upheavals of the '90s. Industry and agriculture were rapidly recovering and the financial system had been rescued and strengthened. Business attracted millions of people to apply their efforts and talents. The institutions of state had begun to work more reliably and the structures of a real civil society had begun to form.
Today, many people recall with sadness that Russia once had a real, working parliament, where social and business interests engaged in dialogue, where compromises were sought and found. They recall how the country's judicial system had begun to feel its independence, and how they discovered that they had a civic role to play in the places they called home. There was hope that people in Russia would become active participants in a dynamic, full-fledged civil society.
In the international arena, the voice of a new Russia began to be heard the voice of a responsible and benevolent good neighbor. Before us lay a long yet well-lit road.
But in the years that followed, Russia turned from it. Today, for all practical purposes, we do not have a real parliament, an independent judiciary, freedom of speech or an effective civil society. The hopes for the formation of a new Russian economy turned out to have been misplaced: Our industrial output, other than raw materials, is not capable of competing even on the domestic market. Russia's international role has changed drastically as well now we are more likely feared than respected.
Who is to blame for this turn of events? Not just the Kremlin. Responsibility for modern Russia's transformation must be laid on the elites the people involved in the adoption of the most important political and economic decisions.
As a new decade opens, we can see what Russia's role is in the world. My country is a huge exporter of two kinds of commodities. The first export is hydrocarbons, crude oil or natural gas. The second is corruption. In years past, the victims of Russia's exported corruption became certain European and American political leaders. Not that long ago, some of them seemed unassailable and incorruptible, but alas, this turned out to be not so.
Unfortunately, in addition to the active export of corruption, domestically we have experienced a monstrous proliferation of graft. The size of incomes from corruption in today's Russia is comparable with the entire federal budget, and dwarfs levels that existed in the country throughout the tumultuous 1990s.
So where will Russia be heading in the next decade?
Certainly a political economy based upon the export of raw materials and corruption can enjoy a certain longevity, so long as there is stable demand for both.
Despite this, it is obvious that by remaining in its current niche Russia with each passing day loses its core national assets. Among these are a system of quality education, expertise and skills in fundamental and applied sciences, and achievements in high-tech sectors. Demand for these assets on the domestic market is beginning to decline as they become superfluous in light of the appetite for raw materials and the spread of corruption. Touting a small number of showcase high-tech projects is window dressing that fools no one.
As a consequence, Russia risks further degenerating into a classic third-world-style, raw materials-based economy, where corruption is the norm rather than the exception and there is no working system of democratic and social institutions. Some may find this prospect for my country to be deserved, but even they should remember that Russia will retain certain ambitions and nuclear weapons for a long time to come.
To what extent Russia's coexistence with its neighbors will turn out to be uncomfortable is a question that needs to be asked today. Indeed, this should be regarded as one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century.
The reserve of robustness in Russia's economy and in the political system that regulates it today is not boundless. A corrupt raw materials-based economy will neither cultivate Russia's vast expanses nor make them liveable. Modern-day mass education and health care systems, good roads and airports, liveable cities with quality municipal-services infrastructure for a corrupt raw materials-based economy, these are superfluous expenditures.
Today we are already seeing the first results of Russia's internal "de-cultivation." Large parts of the country could actually turn out to be not under Moscow's zone of influence, but under other powers whether they be autonomous regional groups, neighboring centers of power like China, or international terrorist or extremist groups.
And the transition from influence to control is just one historical step. As in decaying empires of the past, including the Soviet Union, this step will come sooner or later if Russia remains a country that is not held together by working democratic institutions; if it remains a country teetering between administrative disorganization and authoritarianism.
Russia must make a historic choice. Either we turn back from the dead end toward which we have been heading in recent years and we do it soon or else we continue in this direction and Russia in its current form simply ceases to exist.
It is only Russians, the people and the elites, and not foreigners, who can transform Russia. But the political, business and intellectual elites of the West could give some thought to three questions:
How does a corrupt raw materials-based Russia influence the West today?
What new challenges and threats will the West run up against if today's Russia breaks down into pseudo-state formations only nominally controlled from a single center?
Is today's behavior of the Euro-Atlantic elite in relation to Russia strategically responsible?
I maintain that to deal successfully with its internal political problems, my country must continue to develop a democratic model of governance for all of Russia. Only then will we be able to play a qualitatively new role in the world's division of labor or fill a new niche in global politics.
Russia can and must become an equal, full-fledged part of greater Europe in socio-economic and cultural spheres; a conduit of European political and humanitarian values on the Eurasian space; a strong and reliable connecting link between East Asia and Western Europe, not only through transport corridors but also through intellectual and cultural interaction. The only proper future for my country is that it grows into one of the intellectual and technological centers of the modern world.
The choice of a new place in the world is first and foremost the responsibility of Russia's elites. But the West, which unavoidably exerts a great geopolitical pull on my country, must also assess the real level of its own politico-economic risks and be aware of its own share of responsibility for what vector of development Russia chooses in the next few years. Are Western leaders prepared to return to a strategic dialogue with Russia about its place in the world? Will they develop a strategic policy that is not dependent on Russia's current leading exports?
The answers to these questions will turn upon the choices Russia makes in the next decade. At stake is the fate of our common civilization.
January 29, 2010
A Time and a Place for Russia
By MIKHAIL B. KHODORKOVSKY
Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky is an inmate of the Matrosskaya Tishina prison in Moscow. Prior to his arrest in 2003, he was head of Yukos. This article was translated from the Russian by Stephan Lang.For Russia, the past decade started out on an optimistic note. The country was emerging from a severe financial crisis and the political upheavals of the '90s. Industry and agriculture were rapidly recovering and the financial system had been rescued and strengthened. Business attracted millions of people to apply their efforts and talents. The institutions of state had begun to work more reliably and the structures of a real civil society had begun to form.
Today, many people recall with sadness that Russia once had a real, working parliament, where social and business interests engaged in dialogue, where compromises were sought and found. They recall how the country's judicial system had begun to feel its independence, and how they discovered that they had a civic role to play in the places they called home. There was hope that people in Russia would become active participants in a dynamic, full-fledged civil society.
In the international arena, the voice of a new Russia began to be heard the voice of a responsible and benevolent good neighbor. Before us lay a long yet well-lit road.
But in the years that followed, Russia turned from it. Today, for all practical purposes, we do not have a real parliament, an independent judiciary, freedom of speech or an effective civil society. The hopes for the formation of a new Russian economy turned out to have been misplaced: Our industrial output, other than raw materials, is not capable of competing even on the domestic market. Russia's international role has changed drastically as well now we are more likely feared than respected.
Who is to blame for this turn of events? Not just the Kremlin. Responsibility for modern Russia's transformation must be laid on the elites the people involved in the adoption of the most important political and economic decisions.
As a new decade opens, we can see what Russia's role is in the world. My country is a huge exporter of two kinds of commodities. The first export is hydrocarbons, crude oil or natural gas. The second is corruption. In years past, the victims of Russia's exported corruption became certain European and American political leaders. Not that long ago, some of them seemed unassailable and incorruptible, but alas, this turned out to be not so.
Unfortunately, in addition to the active export of corruption, domestically we have experienced a monstrous proliferation of graft. The size of incomes from corruption in today's Russia is comparable with the entire federal budget, and dwarfs levels that existed in the country throughout the tumultuous 1990s.
So where will Russia be heading in the next decade?
Certainly a political economy based upon the export of raw materials and corruption can enjoy a certain longevity, so long as there is stable demand for both.
Despite this, it is obvious that by remaining in its current niche Russia with each passing day loses its core national assets. Among these are a system of quality education, expertise and skills in fundamental and applied sciences, and achievements in high-tech sectors. Demand for these assets on the domestic market is beginning to decline as they become superfluous in light of the appetite for raw materials and the spread of corruption. Touting a small number of showcase high-tech projects is window dressing that fools no one.
As a consequence, Russia risks further degenerating into a classic third-world-style, raw materials-based economy, where corruption is the norm rather than the exception and there is no working system of democratic and social institutions. Some may find this prospect for my country to be deserved, but even they should remember that Russia will retain certain ambitions and nuclear weapons for a long time to come.
To what extent Russia's coexistence with its neighbors will turn out to be uncomfortable is a question that needs to be asked today. Indeed, this should be regarded as one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century.
The reserve of robustness in Russia's economy and in the political system that regulates it today is not boundless. A corrupt raw materials-based economy will neither cultivate Russia's vast expanses nor make them liveable. Modern-day mass education and health care systems, good roads and airports, liveable cities with quality municipal-services infrastructure for a corrupt raw materials-based economy, these are superfluous expenditures.
Today we are already seeing the first results of Russia's internal "de-cultivation." Large parts of the country could actually turn out to be not under Moscow's zone of influence, but under other powers whether they be autonomous regional groups, neighboring centers of power like China, or international terrorist or extremist groups.
And the transition from influence to control is just one historical step. As in decaying empires of the past, including the Soviet Union, this step will come sooner or later if Russia remains a country that is not held together by working democratic institutions; if it remains a country teetering between administrative disorganization and authoritarianism.
Russia must make a historic choice. Either we turn back from the dead end toward which we have been heading in recent years and we do it soon or else we continue in this direction and Russia in its current form simply ceases to exist.
It is only Russians, the people and the elites, and not foreigners, who can transform Russia. But the political, business and intellectual elites of the West could give some thought to three questions:
How does a corrupt raw materials-based Russia influence the West today?
What new challenges and threats will the West run up against if today's Russia breaks down into pseudo-state formations only nominally controlled from a single center?
Is today's behavior of the Euro-Atlantic elite in relation to Russia strategically responsible?
I maintain that to deal successfully with its internal political problems, my country must continue to develop a democratic model of governance for all of Russia. Only then will we be able to play a qualitatively new role in the world's division of labor or fill a new niche in global politics.
Russia can and must become an equal, full-fledged part of greater Europe in socio-economic and cultural spheres; a conduit of European political and humanitarian values on the Eurasian space; a strong and reliable connecting link between East Asia and Western Europe, not only through transport corridors but also through intellectual and cultural interaction. The only proper future for my country is that it grows into one of the intellectual and technological centers of the modern world.
The choice of a new place in the world is first and foremost the responsibility of Russia's elites. But the West, which unavoidably exerts a great geopolitical pull on my country, must also assess the real level of its own politico-economic risks and be aware of its own share of responsibility for what vector of development Russia chooses in the next few years. Are Western leaders prepared to return to a strategic dialogue with Russia about its place in the world? Will they develop a strategic policy that is not dependent on Russia's current leading exports?
The answers to these questions will turn upon the choices Russia makes in the next decade. At stake is the fate of our common civilization.
[More]
01/29/2010
The Hindu (India)
January 26, 2010
The writer is a former diplomat
Post-Yushchenko, Ukraine is poised to redraw the geopolitics of Eurasia. The defeat in Massachusetts significantly changes the political environment in Washington.
Two game-changers within a week is a rare happening in world politics. Last week was a defining moment for the Barack Obama presidency. The two elections in far-apart places Ukraine and Massachusetts in northeastern U.S. between January 17-20 have a lot in common.
They are both strong public rebukes handed down by furious voters who were promised change and reform and saw zero improvement in their lives. Neither is a political tectonic shift, yet they are grassroots-rebellions and watershed events. They debunked the "colour revolutions" in Ukraine in 2004 and in the U.S. in 2008. For Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, this is the end of the road. For Mr. Obama, the New England defeat bruises his presidency, which reaches a crossroads. Both the elections were about populist anger when passionate hopes and impossible expectations were belied. However, they are also game-changers for world politics. Post-Yushchenko Ukraine is poised to redraw the geopolitics of Eurasia. And the defeat in Massachusetts significantly changes the political environment in Washington, which is bound to impact Mr. Obama's policies at home and abroad.
No matter who wins the February 7 runoff in Ukraine frontrunner Viktor Yanukovich who won 35 per cent of ballots or Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who garnered 25 per cent the result of the first round on January 17 signifies a repudiation of the "Orange Revolution" of 2004, which was masterminded by the U.S. as a smart move in the containment strategy toward Russia. Mr. Yushchenko's stunning rejection he polled just 5 per cent of the votes also underscores a rejection of his principal foreign policy plank of Ukraine's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He consistently opposed any Russian participation in Ukraine's gas transportation system. He sub-served U.S. regional policies in Eurasia NATO's expansion as the global security organisation, control of the Caspian and Central Asian energy sources and counter to the Moscow-led integration processes on the post-Soviet space.
Arguably, Ukraine has restated its close ties with Russia. Both Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko favour repair of ties with Moscow; neither is obsessed with Ukraine's NATO membership; both draw political sustenance from the Ukrainian big business that is tied to Russia, especially in the all-important energy sector. But both are essentially "pro-Ukrainian". Mr. Yanukovich said recently, "Ukraine, quite simply, has been and will be a state outside any blocs... We will not aspire to enter either NATO or the ODKB [Russian acronym for Collective Security Treaty Organisation]... We will follow a pragmatic and balanced foreign policy. We will continue to develop the process of Euro-integration. But its basis will be the modernisation and transformation of Ukraine internally."
The Ukrainian election result provides an underpinning for the preservation of Russia's interests in the Caucasus. The Orange coalition's "split" in September 2008 was largely due to disagreements over Russia's conflict with Georgia. Mr. Yushchenko sought a forceful condemnation of Russia while Mrs. Tymoshenko refused. Equally, a friendly government in Kiev will abandon Mr. Yushchenko's aggressive drive (tacitly encouraged by Washington) to evict Russia from its Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. A flashpoint is approaching as the Russia-Ukraine agreement regarding Sevastopol is due to expire in 2017 and Mr. Yushchenko was bracing for a showdown with Moscow. Sevastopol is critical for Russia's effective presence as a Black Sea power. Mr.Yushckenko's departure, therefore, amounts to a setback for the U.S. strategy to convert the Black Sea into a 'NATO lake'. The first-ever U.S. military bases in Romania and Bulgaria already pose some challenge to Russia's traditional supremacy in the Black Sea region.
Ukraine's gravitation back to Russia has implications for energy security. The restoration of Russia-Turkmenistan energy ties; Russia's forays into the Western monopoly over Azerbaijan's energy reserves; Russo-Turkish concord over the proposed South Stream pipeline to southern Europe and the Balkans these trends get accentuated with the regime change in Kiev. Mr. Yushchenko has been spearheading the idea of promoting Ukraine as a transit country for the Caspian energy, bypassing Russian territory. The Central European countries at present depend on energy supplies to meet 50 per cent of their requirements. The U.S. agenda of forming a cordon of "New Europeans" in the middle of Europe doggedly opposing Moscow can never gain traction so long as they remain heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. Ukraine was a vital chip in the U.S. geo-strategy.
Thus, the regime change in Kiev has serious fallouts for Russia's overall relations with Europe, although the equations are not to be seen in zero-sum terms either. A pragmatic economic-energy relationship between Ukraine and Russia that Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko espouse suits Western Europe whose priority is to avoid the repetition of the spats between Moscow and Kiev that led to "gas crisis". Again, Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko share a common desire to foster ties with the EU but EU is reticent about getting overstretched and would rather allow Russia remain a stakeholder in Ukraine's stability. Also, Europe is wary of annoying Russia by drawing Ukraine into the Western orbit.
Unlike in 2004 when Moscow unwisely took a public stance supportive of Mr. Yanukovich, it has been savvy enough to keep to the background. Conceivably, Moscow is equally comfortable with Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko. The surge in clan politics and Moscow's nexus with the dominant clique of Ukrainian oligarchs ensure that Washington will be hard-pressed to rival its influence in Kiev. The oligarchic clans coalescing around a dozen or so powerful financial-industrial groups dictate Ukrainian politics. Paradoxically, this is also where Western opinion fundamentally erred in the halcyon days in 2004. The neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration propagated the Orange revolution to be some sort of a political catharsis that ushered in a seamless era of liberal democracy although in reality it was a regrouping of the oligarchic clans.
No one knows the Ukrainian oligarchs better than the Kremlin. They invariably seek Moscow's backing. However, Moscow also faces a dilemma insofar as Ukrainian politicians cannot be called "pro-Russian" forces, either. The Ukrainian industrial-financial interests who bankroll Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko strongly defend their economic interests with both Russia and the West. Curiously, Ukraine is set to follow the same path that Russia took. As a leading Russian commentator Anton Orekh put it, "the existence of freedom of expression and free media in no way compensated for the lack of sausage and bread on the table...Russians felt sufficiently disappointed with the democrats to accept a person like Putin. Ukraine is moving in the same direction... Ukrainians already feel prepared to have their own Putinyuk, or Medvedenko [popular Ukrainian names]."
Of course, Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili must feel a terribly lonely man in Eurasia today. The Georgian constitution forbids a third term for him. The big question is whether Washington can afford to see him walk into the sunset when the power calculus in Eurasia is palpably shifting. A poll conducted by the U.S. National Democracy Institute on January 4 came up with the timely finding that 60 per cent of Georgian respondents favour another term for Saakashvili in the election due in 2013. Significantly, last week a delegation of U.S. senators led by Senator John McCain arrived in Tbilisi for a show of solidarity with the only surviving progeny of colour revolution on the planet.
However, Georgians are notoriously pragmatic. They have an old saying: "If a bear grabs you, call him daddy. If a nearby hunter does not help you by either killing the bear or rescuing you from its grip, maybe it's better to call him daddy." The NATO's recent overtures to Moscow; Obama's offer of reset U.S.'s ties with Russia; Europe's advice to Tbilisi to resolve tensions with Russia Georgian political class has a lot to brood about. Meanwhile, Georgian opposition has initiated a "dialogue" with Moscow. Incipient forces that give priority to ties with Russia are appearing in Tbilisi as well.
The setback in Ukraine comes at a sensitive juncture in the U.S.-Russia relations. It becomes a litmus test of Washington's willingness to recognise Russia's special interests in the territories of the former Soviet Union. If Washington confronts the rising curve of Russian influence in Kiev, it will derail the U.S.'s reset of ties with Russia, which Mr.Obama promised. But if it reconciles with Russia's predominance in Ukraine, the Republican right will berate the Obama administration for failure to stand up to "revanchist" Russia. The signs are ominous. Mr. Saakahsvili conferred on Mr. McCain Georgia's highest award in token of his rock-like support to Tbilisi's war with Russia. Mr. McCain responded: "Of all the honours I've received in my life, the National Hero Award is among the most meaningful and it is one that I would cherish for ever."
There is a Third Way for Washington to deal with Ukraine. In the highly strategic environment in which Ukraine is situated, what serves the U.S. best will be a "pro-Ukrainian" president in Kiev rather than a "pro-American" president. But it is an audacious thought and is politically risky, and the Massachusetts defeat leaves Mr. Obama vulnerable to criticism.
January 26, 2010
Obama needs a pro-Ukrainian President
By M. K. BhadrakumarThe writer is a former diplomat
Post-Yushchenko, Ukraine is poised to redraw the geopolitics of Eurasia. The defeat in Massachusetts significantly changes the political environment in Washington.
Two game-changers within a week is a rare happening in world politics. Last week was a defining moment for the Barack Obama presidency. The two elections in far-apart places Ukraine and Massachusetts in northeastern U.S. between January 17-20 have a lot in common.
They are both strong public rebukes handed down by furious voters who were promised change and reform and saw zero improvement in their lives. Neither is a political tectonic shift, yet they are grassroots-rebellions and watershed events. They debunked the "colour revolutions" in Ukraine in 2004 and in the U.S. in 2008. For Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, this is the end of the road. For Mr. Obama, the New England defeat bruises his presidency, which reaches a crossroads. Both the elections were about populist anger when passionate hopes and impossible expectations were belied. However, they are also game-changers for world politics. Post-Yushchenko Ukraine is poised to redraw the geopolitics of Eurasia. And the defeat in Massachusetts significantly changes the political environment in Washington, which is bound to impact Mr. Obama's policies at home and abroad.
No matter who wins the February 7 runoff in Ukraine frontrunner Viktor Yanukovich who won 35 per cent of ballots or Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who garnered 25 per cent the result of the first round on January 17 signifies a repudiation of the "Orange Revolution" of 2004, which was masterminded by the U.S. as a smart move in the containment strategy toward Russia. Mr. Yushchenko's stunning rejection he polled just 5 per cent of the votes also underscores a rejection of his principal foreign policy plank of Ukraine's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He consistently opposed any Russian participation in Ukraine's gas transportation system. He sub-served U.S. regional policies in Eurasia NATO's expansion as the global security organisation, control of the Caspian and Central Asian energy sources and counter to the Moscow-led integration processes on the post-Soviet space.
Arguably, Ukraine has restated its close ties with Russia. Both Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko favour repair of ties with Moscow; neither is obsessed with Ukraine's NATO membership; both draw political sustenance from the Ukrainian big business that is tied to Russia, especially in the all-important energy sector. But both are essentially "pro-Ukrainian". Mr. Yanukovich said recently, "Ukraine, quite simply, has been and will be a state outside any blocs... We will not aspire to enter either NATO or the ODKB [Russian acronym for Collective Security Treaty Organisation]... We will follow a pragmatic and balanced foreign policy. We will continue to develop the process of Euro-integration. But its basis will be the modernisation and transformation of Ukraine internally."
The Ukrainian election result provides an underpinning for the preservation of Russia's interests in the Caucasus. The Orange coalition's "split" in September 2008 was largely due to disagreements over Russia's conflict with Georgia. Mr. Yushchenko sought a forceful condemnation of Russia while Mrs. Tymoshenko refused. Equally, a friendly government in Kiev will abandon Mr. Yushchenko's aggressive drive (tacitly encouraged by Washington) to evict Russia from its Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. A flashpoint is approaching as the Russia-Ukraine agreement regarding Sevastopol is due to expire in 2017 and Mr. Yushchenko was bracing for a showdown with Moscow. Sevastopol is critical for Russia's effective presence as a Black Sea power. Mr.Yushckenko's departure, therefore, amounts to a setback for the U.S. strategy to convert the Black Sea into a 'NATO lake'. The first-ever U.S. military bases in Romania and Bulgaria already pose some challenge to Russia's traditional supremacy in the Black Sea region.
Ukraine's gravitation back to Russia has implications for energy security. The restoration of Russia-Turkmenistan energy ties; Russia's forays into the Western monopoly over Azerbaijan's energy reserves; Russo-Turkish concord over the proposed South Stream pipeline to southern Europe and the Balkans these trends get accentuated with the regime change in Kiev. Mr. Yushchenko has been spearheading the idea of promoting Ukraine as a transit country for the Caspian energy, bypassing Russian territory. The Central European countries at present depend on energy supplies to meet 50 per cent of their requirements. The U.S. agenda of forming a cordon of "New Europeans" in the middle of Europe doggedly opposing Moscow can never gain traction so long as they remain heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. Ukraine was a vital chip in the U.S. geo-strategy.
Thus, the regime change in Kiev has serious fallouts for Russia's overall relations with Europe, although the equations are not to be seen in zero-sum terms either. A pragmatic economic-energy relationship between Ukraine and Russia that Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko espouse suits Western Europe whose priority is to avoid the repetition of the spats between Moscow and Kiev that led to "gas crisis". Again, Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko share a common desire to foster ties with the EU but EU is reticent about getting overstretched and would rather allow Russia remain a stakeholder in Ukraine's stability. Also, Europe is wary of annoying Russia by drawing Ukraine into the Western orbit.
Unlike in 2004 when Moscow unwisely took a public stance supportive of Mr. Yanukovich, it has been savvy enough to keep to the background. Conceivably, Moscow is equally comfortable with Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko. The surge in clan politics and Moscow's nexus with the dominant clique of Ukrainian oligarchs ensure that Washington will be hard-pressed to rival its influence in Kiev. The oligarchic clans coalescing around a dozen or so powerful financial-industrial groups dictate Ukrainian politics. Paradoxically, this is also where Western opinion fundamentally erred in the halcyon days in 2004. The neoconservatives in the George W. Bush administration propagated the Orange revolution to be some sort of a political catharsis that ushered in a seamless era of liberal democracy although in reality it was a regrouping of the oligarchic clans.
No one knows the Ukrainian oligarchs better than the Kremlin. They invariably seek Moscow's backing. However, Moscow also faces a dilemma insofar as Ukrainian politicians cannot be called "pro-Russian" forces, either. The Ukrainian industrial-financial interests who bankroll Mr. Yanukovich and Mrs. Tymoshenko strongly defend their economic interests with both Russia and the West. Curiously, Ukraine is set to follow the same path that Russia took. As a leading Russian commentator Anton Orekh put it, "the existence of freedom of expression and free media in no way compensated for the lack of sausage and bread on the table...Russians felt sufficiently disappointed with the democrats to accept a person like Putin. Ukraine is moving in the same direction... Ukrainians already feel prepared to have their own Putinyuk, or Medvedenko [popular Ukrainian names]."
Of course, Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili must feel a terribly lonely man in Eurasia today. The Georgian constitution forbids a third term for him. The big question is whether Washington can afford to see him walk into the sunset when the power calculus in Eurasia is palpably shifting. A poll conducted by the U.S. National Democracy Institute on January 4 came up with the timely finding that 60 per cent of Georgian respondents favour another term for Saakashvili in the election due in 2013. Significantly, last week a delegation of U.S. senators led by Senator John McCain arrived in Tbilisi for a show of solidarity with the only surviving progeny of colour revolution on the planet.
However, Georgians are notoriously pragmatic. They have an old saying: "If a bear grabs you, call him daddy. If a nearby hunter does not help you by either killing the bear or rescuing you from its grip, maybe it's better to call him daddy." The NATO's recent overtures to Moscow; Obama's offer of reset U.S.'s ties with Russia; Europe's advice to Tbilisi to resolve tensions with Russia Georgian political class has a lot to brood about. Meanwhile, Georgian opposition has initiated a "dialogue" with Moscow. Incipient forces that give priority to ties with Russia are appearing in Tbilisi as well.
The setback in Ukraine comes at a sensitive juncture in the U.S.-Russia relations. It becomes a litmus test of Washington's willingness to recognise Russia's special interests in the territories of the former Soviet Union. If Washington confronts the rising curve of Russian influence in Kiev, it will derail the U.S.'s reset of ties with Russia, which Mr.Obama promised. But if it reconciles with Russia's predominance in Ukraine, the Republican right will berate the Obama administration for failure to stand up to "revanchist" Russia. The signs are ominous. Mr. Saakahsvili conferred on Mr. McCain Georgia's highest award in token of his rock-like support to Tbilisi's war with Russia. Mr. McCain responded: "Of all the honours I've received in my life, the National Hero Award is among the most meaningful and it is one that I would cherish for ever."
There is a Third Way for Washington to deal with Ukraine. In the highly strategic environment in which Ukraine is situated, what serves the U.S. best will be a "pro-Ukrainian" president in Kiev rather than a "pro-American" president. But it is an audacious thought and is politically risky, and the Massachusetts defeat leaves Mr. Obama vulnerable to criticism.
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